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THE PATH ALONG THE RIDGE: REGIONAL
PLANNNING IN THE FACE OF UNCERTAINTY 1
Kai N. Lee*
The Northwest Power Act2 responds to the changing circumstances of
electric power in the Pacific Northwest by defining policy directions and
creating new institutional arrangements for regional power planning. 3
The Northwest Power Planning Council (Council) is the agent of the re-
gion in meeting the challenges of planning under the Act.4 This paper
discusses the conceptual framework of regional power planning-a task
that confronts a degree of uncertainty and risk without historical pre-
cedent.
For a quarter-century, electricity demand grew rapidly in the North-
west, doubling roughly every ten years. 5 This growth was readily met by
the low-cost, abundant supply of hydroelectric energy developed by the
federal government and Northwest utilities in the Columbia River and its
tributaries. 6 Steady growth made for simple planning: build more for a
* A.B., Columbia, 1966; Ph.D., Princeton, 1971; Associate Professor of Environmental Studies
and Political Science at the University of Washington; sometime consultant to the Northwest Power
Planning Council. This article owes much of its thinking to contributions of members of the Power
Council, especially Charles T. Collins, member from the State of Washington.
Author's note: An earlier version of this article was prepared as a discussion paper in March 1982
and distributed widely in the Pacific Northwest. Numerous written and oral comments on the paper
were received, and the Northwest Power Planning Council discussed both the paper and comments on
it at the Council's meeting on May 6, 1982. In November 1982 the Council adopted a planning
philosophy similar to the one outlined here in its Resource Options Decision Memorandum. This
article incorporates the author's responses to earlier comments as well as two major analyses'stimu-
lated by the discussion paper: a study of the resource options concept concluded in October 1982 by
the Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference Committee; and an analysis commissioned by the Council
and carried out by the Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories.
1. Many of the concepts discussed here were initially developed in R. Watson, S. Aos, J. Doug-
lass, & P. Downey, Power Planning and Uncertainty (revised version, Feb. 3, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as WSEO I], a paper prepared at the Washington State Energy Office. These arguments were
later extended in S. Aos, J. Douglass, P. Downey, G. Hill, & R. Watson, The Design and Evaluation
of a Flexible Power Plan (July 4, 1982) [hereinafter cited as WSEO I1].
2. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, Pub. L. 96-501, 94 Stat.
2697 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 839 (Supp. V 1981)) [hereinafter cited as Northwest Power.Act].
3. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST
ELECTRIC POWER PLANNING AND CONSERVATION ACT 41ff & 75ff (1981) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY]. A helpful perspective may be found in E. Redman, A Brief Functional Analysis of the
New Northwest Power Act (June 1, 1981) (unpublished memorandum) (copy on file with the Wash-
ington Law Review).
4. Northwest Power Act, supra note 2, § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 839b (Supp. V 1981).
5. See K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS, ELECTRIC POWER AND THE FuTuRE OF THE PACIFIC
NORTHWEST 135 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ELECTRIC POWER].
6. See generally id. ch. 2 (discussing sources and uses of electric power in the region).
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brighter tomorrow. When the potential of the region's rivers was fully
harnessed, 7 it seemed sensible to turn to nuclear8 and coal: supplies that
promised to facilitate further growth at higher-but still reasonable-
cost. But, even as the Northwest Power Act was emerging from Con-
gress, the era of steady growth ended, a victim of rising power costs and
an unstable economy.
There are no facts about the future: predicting energy demand is an
uncertain and risky enterprise. If the growth rate differs by only 0.3% per
year from the anticipated rate, the gap between the anticipated load and
actual load will amount to the equivalent of a nuclear plant in less than
fifteen years. 9 Our present ability to forecast demand falls considerably
short of even this 0.3% criterion. ' 0 It now takes several billion dollars and
more than ten years to plan and build a major power plant. I The costs to
the economy of not having enough power are similarly huge. 12
The planning problem is thus a daunting one: the best one can do with
current methods seems to entail major risks of either building too much or
7. There is a relatively small, but perhaps important, quantity of hydropower still to be de-
veloped on the mainstem of the Columbia. The possibilities of utilizing this resource within the plan-
ning framework developed in this article are discussed in Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference
Committee, A Discussion Paper of Resource Options 48-49 (Oct. 1982) [hereinafter cited as PNUCC
Options Paper]. A substantial quantity of so-called "small hydro" is available for development on
smaller rivers and streams in the Northwest.
8. See generally ELECTRIC POWER, supra note 5, ch. 3 (describing the Hydro-Thermal Power
Program).
9. Power demand in the Northwest in 1980 amounted to approximately 16,600 average me-
gawatts. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION FORECASTS OF
ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST, 1980-2000 (FINAL) 28 (July 1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as BPA 1982 FORECAST]. Compare the 1.6% annual average rate of growth estimated in the
base case of this forecast to one only 0.3% higher. The BPA projects that by 1995 the demand at
1.6% will be 21,101 average megawatts; at 1.9% growth the demand would be more than 22.000
average megawatts, 900 megawatts higher. The output of a large nuclear power station is convention-
ally estimated at 60 percent "load factor" (the fraction of the time the plant is delivering its full rated
output). For a plant nominally rated at 1000 megawatts, then, 600 average megawatts may be used as
a rule of thumb. This figure is smaller than the difference between our two estimates.
10. The BPA forecast uses low, base case, and high forecasts whose average annual growth rates
range from 0.9% to 2.4%. BPA 1982 FORECAST, supra note 9, at 4-10. These values are based upon
judgment. The BPA also judges that there is no more than a 75% probability that actual loads will fall
within this range. Id. By the year 2000 the low and high forecasts differ by approximately 7900
average megawatts. Id. at 28. To gain a sense of the uncertainties involved, consider the fact that a
typical coal-fired power plant is rated at 500 average megawatts; such a plant costs roughly $1 billion
in 1982 dollars.
I 1. R. BERNEY, W. BUTCHER, G. HINMAN, R. LEWIS & L. SCHWARTZ, INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF
WNP-4 AND WNP-5 (March 15, 1982) (Washington Energy Research Center, Washington State Uni-
versity) [hereinafter cited as WERC FINAL REPORT]. The Final Report states that these two nuclear
projects, now terminated, would have taken thirteen years and $12.5 billion to complete. Id. at 15,
36.
12. See generally id. at 133-37 (discussing imbalances between loads and resources).
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too little, with heavy penalties either way. 13 In the image of Dan Evans,
chairman of-the Power Planning Council, the Northwest is walking along
a narrow ridge: we can ill afford missteps, but we cannot see as.far as We
stride. Thus, developiing a regional plan goes beyond selecting resources
for acquisition by the B.onneville Power Administration: it must also in.-
clude thinking about how resources should be acquired., together with
careful consideration of what kind of resources are suitable for responsi-
ble planning in the face of uncertainty. This article seeks to stimulate dis-
cussion of how to do this better.
I. THE UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT
From the late 1940's until approximately 1970, demand for electricity
in the United States grew in parallel with the gross national product. This
growth reflected the fact that electric power was a good buy. Not only
was electricity convenient, but the real cost of supplying power steadily
declined, as new technology captured economies of scale. 14 In the North-
west, the dominant resource was (and remains) hydropower, developed
on a large scale since the federal government launched Grand Coulee
Dam during the New Deal. 15 Northwest hydro projects, built during an
era of low construction costs and low interest rates--often backed by the
federal government-produced the cheapest electricity in the nation. 16 In
this setting, vigorous growth in power production was socially rational:
overall economic growth would not be constrained by power shortages;
the advance of technology meant that new supplies would lower the aver-
age system cost as cheaper sources were brought on line; and the growth
of demand in neighboring regions, especially California and the South-
west, provided markets for Northwest surpluses. -
As steady economic growth gave way in the 1970"s to stagflation and
energy crisis, the conditions underlying utility planning changed. 17 Plan-
13. The case of Washington Public Power Supply Systems (WPPSS) Projects 4 and 5 illustrates
the difficulties. Fearing the economic consequences of shortage, 88 utilities agreed in the mid-1970's
to build two plants now terminated because insufficient demand for their output is anticipated. That
termination action itself has become the focus of legal and financial crisis.,See generally E. CARLSON,
J. ELORRIAGA & G. WEYERHAEUSER, A REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE ALTERNATIVES
FACING THE REGION ON WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM UNITS 4 AND 5, REPORT OF THE
GOVERNORS' PANEL (1981).
14. See Chapman, Tyrrell & Mount, Electricity Demand Growth and the Energy Crisis. 178
SCIENCE 703, 706 (1972).
15. See generally C. McKINLEY, UNCLE SAM IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST ch. 4 (1952) (discussing
history of BPA in the Northwest); R. BESSEY, PACIFIC NORTHWEST REGIONAL PIIANNING - A REVIEW
(1963) (Bulletin No. 6, Division of Power Resources, Washington Department of Conservation).
16. See ELECTRIC POWER, supra note 5, at 31.
17. See Willrich, The Electric Utility and the Energy Crisis Part 1. PUB. -UTIL. FORT., Jan. 2,
1975, at 22-28; and Part 11, PUB. UTL. FORT., Jan. 16, 1975, at 25-34.
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ning should have changed too, but it lagged,18 with serious consequences
for utilities and their ratepayers. Seven conditions now shape the future:
1. Federal sponsorship' 9 remains limited in reach. Despite the regional au-
thority20 to acquire resources under the Act, the initiative still rests with
utilities, local governments, and other project sponsors. 2 1
2. The marginal cost of power is rising,22 but both the cost and the output of
a given project remain uncertain.23 The troubles of the Washington Public
Power Supply System24 have drawn attention to rising rates. 25
3. Conservation entails the stimulation and coordination of activities under-
taken by thousands of individuals and firms. 26 The utilities have had rela-
tively little experience with conservation or decentralized sources of supply,
and both planning and regulatory oversight have been hesitant and often
confused.
4. Although the Northwest has a strong tradition of public utility owner-
ship,27 the open planning process created in the Northwest Power Act28 is
unfamiliar and uncomfortable for the utilities, especially during the period
of adjustment to the institutional arrangements and processes created in the
Act. Openness and a complex agenda make the planning process difficult
for the Council to manage as well.
18. See generally ELECTRIC POWER, supra note 5, chs. 3-5 (describing events leading up to the
Northwest Power Act).
19. The principal statements are the Bonneville Project Act of 1937, 16 U.S.C. § 832 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981), and the Pacific Northwest Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act. 16
U.S.C. § 838 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
20. See Northwest Power Act, supra note 2, § 6, 16 U.S.C. § 839d (Supp. V 1981).
21. Id.
22. See WERC FINAL REPORT, supra note I1, at 84.
23. See ELECTRIC POWER, supra note 5, at 111-13. Costs are uncertain because of difficulties in
accurately estimating construction costs, overruns, and delays; the cost of fuel; expenses for opera-
tions and maintenance, especially for new technologies; tightening environmental control obligations
(such as waste disposal, decommissioning, or advanced pollution control equipment); and the ex-
pense of replacement power in the event of unforeseen outages or fuel-supply interruptions.
The amount of power produced by a project is also subject to uncertainties: a project may fail to be
completed or to be operated (a so-called "dry hole"); it may produce less power than planned; or it
may encounter unanticipated forced outages.
24. For an independent analysis of the situation facing WPPSS Projects 4 and 5, see the study
commissioned by the Washington State Legislature, WERC FINAL REPORT, supra note 11; Lee.
WPPSS 4 and 5: The agony and the legacy (Part I), The Weekly (Seattle), May 12, 1982, at 2. col. 1:
(Part 11), The Weekly (Seattle), May 19, 1982, at 2, col. 1.
25. Note that the projected average rate increases are modest in real economic terms (WERC
FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 22) but political reaction reflects instead the large size of the nominal
increases in rates.
26. See Lee, Regional Electric Power and Local Governments, 9 WASH PUB. POL'Y NOTES 4
(Autumn 1981).
27. See generally ELECTRIC POWER, supra note 5, chs. 2 & 3 (describing the history of the public
power movement in the Pacific Northwest).
28. See Northwest Power Act, supra note 2, § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 839b (Supp. V 1981).
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5. Forecasting demand29 has become extraordinarily difficult.30 Where the
smooth and rapid growth of the 1950's and 1960's allowed planners simply
to extrapolate historical behavior, the period beyond the mid-1970's contin-
ues to be elusive, despite ever more sophisticated methods of analyzing past
demand patterns. 31
29. It is important to bear in mind that definitions of forecasts differ. The Council's forecast,
pursuant to the Northwest Power Act, supra note 2, § 4(e)(3)(D), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(e)(3)(D) (Supp.
V 1981), will be a projection of electric power sales for the 20-year period commencing April 28,
1983, explicitly taking into account conservation programs already underway and cogeneration. Con-
servation induced by projected increases in rates will be treated as an addition to the supply of power.
Variations in the treatment of conservation and cogeneration have led to substantial confusion in the
interpretation of forecasts, including the ones developed by the BPA and the Washington Energy
Research Center.
30. The uncertainties in forecasting are traceable to two causes. First, there is now greater uncer-
tainty in projecting economic trends, a result of uneven macroeconomic performance in the last dozen
years, together with a continued increase in mobility, which has made demographic projections less
reliable. Second, the Pacific Northwest is experiencing rapidly rising utility rates, after more than
half a century of electric prices that decreased in real economic terms. The response of ratepayers to
rising rates is likely to be both significant and complex over the next several years; the character and
magnitude of reactions to increasing real prices is not well understood at the national level, not to
mention the Northwest region. See Northwest Power Planning Council, Economic and Demographic
Assumptions 2-5 (Revised Draft, Dec. 10, 1982).
A major consequence of these uncertainties is that the input assumptions in long-range forecasts
cannot be estimated with satisfactory precision. At best, then, the information base from which the
analyst begins can only produce an estimate of the likely range of future demands, as described in the
text. Moreover, when the estimates are imprecise, a regional plan limiting the discretion of the
Bonneville Power administrator to make regional power investments (as set forth in the Northwest
Power Act, supra note 2, § 4(d)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(d)(2) (Supp. V 1981)) becomes, faute de
mieux, a form of regional economic plan.
The challenge of the Northwest Power Act can therefore be framed in the following terms: the
Council must attempt to set investment priorities in conservation and electric power development
which will facilitate-rather than direct or circumscribe-the overall economic evolution of the re-
gion in response to private initiative, market forces, and policies set by duly constituted governmental
authority.
The Council's choices of economic and demographic assumptions are set forth in Northwest Power
Planning Council, Decision Memorandum, Economic and Demographic Assumptions (Oct. 13,
1982). For a critique of economic efficiency as a target of energy planning, see Winner, Energy
Regimes and the Ideology of Efficiency, in ENERGY AND TRANSPORT: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
POLICY ISSUES 270-76 (1982).
31. It is instructive to examine the track record of the Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference
Committee (known as the "West Group" prior to passage of the Northwest Power Act), which pub-
lishes annual 20-year forecasts for the Bonneville service area. The West Group forecasts for
1969-1980 are compared with actual average loads in WERC FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 77; a
similar compilation, covering the years 1965-75, is presented in BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRA-
TION, THE ROLE OFTHE BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST POWER SUP-
PLY SYSTEM IV-84 to -85 (July 22, 1977) (Draft Environmental Statement). These tables demonstrate
several interesting tendencies: (1) Since the 1969-1970 operating year (and in a majority of cases
earlier as well) the PNUCC forecasts have consistently projected larger loads than actually occurred.
(2) The magnitude of the overestimates increased beginning in the 1973-1974 year, regularly reach-
ing more than 10 percentage points in the late 1970's. (3) There is a weak tendency for the size of the
overestimate to correlate with regional economic conditions in the year forecast was made. (I am
indebted to H.M. Mozer for bringing these data to my attention, and for pointing out the third of these
trends.)
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6. Large, capital-intensive resource projects now pose substantial risks.
Costs and schedules have been difficult to control. 32 Moreover, with the
slowing of load growth, arrangements for fully utilizing large facilities have
become unexpectedly important. 33
7. A consequence of the last two points is that commitments to large re-
sources a decade or more in advance-standard practice now-are no lon-
ger tenable without substantial change.
Despite the explosion of uncertainty-indeed, because of it-it is more
urgent than ever to plan and to share risks regionally .34 A central feature
of the Northwest Power Act is the ability to plan a cost-effective mix of
resources on a regional basis. 35 The uncertainties listed above imply a
need for regional risk management as well-a process for insuring long
term cost-effectiveness in the face of uncertainty.
II. PRINCIPLES FOR MANAGING RISK
Regional planning can be organized around eight principles, several of
which are drawn directly from the Northwest Power Act. These principles
form a coherent framework for dealing with the uncertainties facing the
Pacific Northwest. To facilitate exposition, they are first listed briefly:
1. In place of deterministic planning, there should be a regional risk-man-
agement process 36 that stresses flexibility.
2. In particular, the planning process should prepare the region to meet a
The second trend, the increase in error since 1973-1974, may be traceable to the fact that firm sales
of hydropower from the Federal Columbia River Power System to the investor-owned utilities of the
Northwest ended in 1973. As a result, rates paid by consumers served by investor-owned utilities
began to rise that year. With the rise in rates, consumption dropped, and the size of this change may
have eluded forecasters. See THE WPPSS INDEPENDENT STUDY STEERING COMMITTEE, AN EVALUA-
TION OF THE WASHINGTON ENERGY RESEARCH CENTER'S FINAL REPORT, INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF
WNP-4 AND WNP-5, at 6-11 (Mar. 26, 1982); Economic and Demographic Assumptions, supra note
30, at 2-5.
32. For a careful analysis of the components of cost in generating stations, see P. HILL, POWER
GENERATION (1977); I WASHINGTON STATE SENATE ENERGY AND UTILITIES COMMITTEE WPPSS IN-
QUIRY, 47th Leg., CAUSES OF COST OVERRUNS AND SCHEDULE DELAYS ON THE FIVE WPPSS POWER
PLANTS (1982); WASHINGTON ENERGY RESEARCH CENTER, COSTS AND SCHEDULES. MODULE III FINAL
REPORT (Jan. 1982).
33. See WASHINGTON ENERGY RESEARCH CENTER, MARKETS FOR IMPORTS OF ELECTRICITY, MOD-
ULE IV FINAL REPORT (Jan. 1982).
34. See Lee, Electricity: Toward a Regional Strategy, in ENERGY POLICY AND PUBLIC ADMINIS-
TRATION (1980).
35. Northwest Power Act, supra note 2, § 4(e), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(e) (Supp. V 1981).
36. The utilities' appraisal of this approach is contained in PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7.
The argument of this article accords with their conclusion: "The electric utility industry is well aware
of the need for greater flexibility in the planning and construction process. A well designed and
workable options process would be highly welcome." PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7, at 2.
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wide range of loads in all the years encompassed by the plan, instead of
relying upon a most-likely demand forecast.37
3. The regional plan should shift the burden of risk from individual project
proponents to the region as a whole, as a form of regionwide insurance. 38
4. The Act establishes fundamental priorities for resource planning: 39 to
minimize expected cost, while giving priority, first, to conservation; second,
to renewable resources; third, to resources utilizing waste heat or generating
methods of high fuel conversion efficiency; and fourth, to "all other re-
sources."40
5. The Northwest Power Act also creates an institutional structure for de-
centralized implementation of a centrally written plan.4 1
6. In place of the conventional bias toward economies of scale in power
generation, planners should search for cost-effective combinations of con-
servation and resources that can provide planning flexibility. When compar-
ing projects that are equally costly to the region, those available on short
notice should be given priority over those with-long lead-times; small proj-
ects should be preferred to large ones; and programs that can be slowed,
halted, or reversed should be more useful than those entailing inflexible
commitments.
7. The planning process should manage the burdens of financing, licensing,
and institutional change by making regional commitments on a schedule
that reflects the slower load growth that characterizes a period of rising real
rates.
8. The integrated hydro system has been augmented with thermal generation
developed on a piecemeal basis. The Northwest Power Act-and the risk-
management approach in particular-implies a substantially more complex
regional power system,42 one encompassing activities and actors unfamiliar
to the utility community. 43 The challenge of this additional complexity must
be taken seriously in the planning process.44
37. See supra notes 30-31 (discussing limited accuracy of forecasting).
38. As the number of participants in a project increases, the risk to the collectivity decreases,
since adverse outcomes will be more widely shared. For the economic theory putting this concept on
a rigorous foundation, see Arrow & Lind, Uncertainty and the evaluation of public investments, 60
AM. EcON. REv. 364 (1970).
39. Northwest Power Act, supra note 2, § 4(e)(l), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(e)(l) (Supp. V 1981).
40. Id.
41. Section 4(e)(2) of the Act authorizes central planning by the council. Id. § 4(e)(2), 16 U.S.C.
§ 839b(e)(2). Section 2(5) expressly foreswears limits or restrictions upon the freedom of utilities and
maintains "the authorities and responsibilities of State and local governments, electric utility sys-
tems, water management agencies, and other non-Federal entities." Id. § 2(5)(A), 16 U.S.C. §
839(5)(A).
42. See PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7, at 3.
43. The technological implications of increased complexity are addressed, in part, by a System
Analysis Model being built by a committee of the Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference Committee.
Washington Law Review Vol. 58:317, 1983
The paradox of regional planning and decentralized execution can be re-
solved in two somewhat different, but complementary, ways. 45 First,
there should be liberal use of markets and market-like incentives. 46 Sec-
ond, the plan and planning process should be instruments of political
leadership, articulating purposes 47 and mobilizing the energies of the di-
verse interests whose partly independent activities constitute the imple-
mentation of the plan. Decentralized execution will not be easy to
achieve, but there is an important opportunity for Council leadership in
the fact that the economic interests of the region parallel the goals of the
Act.
The shift from deterministic planning to regional risk management is
fundamental. This article focuses on planning, but a flexible approach
implies significant changes in the way that projects are developed and
This model estimates the interactive effects of adding new supplies, such as renewable resources, to
the existing regional hydro system. The System Analysis Model is an outgrowth of a long tradition of
technical cooperation among the region's utilities, a relationship specified in the Pacific Northwest
Coordination Agreement of 1964. On the Coordination Agreement, see ELECTRIC POWER, supra note
5, at 54-55.
It remains to be seen, however, whether this technical level of cooperation can be extended to non-
utility actors such as industrial firms undertaking cogeneration, and whether technical cooperation
can foster institutional collaboration. It is a hopeful sign, accordingly, that the use of the System
Analysis Model for regional planning is discussed in PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7, at 23-27.
44. There are two critical differences in regional power planning under the Act. First, financing
of a major resource may be accomplished through acquisition of its capability by the Administrator of
BPA, pursuant to authority granted him under § 6(a), (d), (e), (f), (h), & (1), 16 U.S.C. § 839d(a),
(d), (e), (f), & (I) (Supp. V 1981). But second, authorization for acquisition depends upon designa-
tion of that resource in the Northwest Power Planning Council's regional energy plan, in accordance
with the process set forth in § 4(d)-(g), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(d)-(g) (Supp. V 198 1), the Administrator's
authority is further subject to the constraints outlined in § 6(b)-(m), 16 U.S.C. § 839d(b)-(m) (Supp.
V 1981). These new arrangements create a major financing role for the BPA, extending, perhaps a
great deal, the possibilities devised under the rubric of "net billing" in the 1968 Hydro-Thermal
Power Program. See generally ELECTRIC POWER, supra note 5, ch. 3 (discussion and explanation of
net billing). Moreover, a new set of actors, state governments acting through their representatives on
the Council, effectively controls access to the regional financing mechanism. These two principal
changes affect the independence with which utilities may plan their own activities by altering the
financial and organizational incentives for joint action in response to expectations of future power
demand. The Northwest Power Act affects utility planning in other significant ways as well, notably
through its requirement for a fish and wildlife program in the Columbia River basin.
45. See generally ELECTRIC POWER, supra note 5, ch. 7 (analyzing conceptual approaches to
regional planning).
46. See generally C. SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST (1977) (advocating use of
market arrangements to implement public policy).
47. See P. SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION (1957) (emphasizing the role of purposes
in organizational management).
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programs managed. Regional risk management also requires coordination
of operations with planning,48 in order to permit adjustment of both plans
and operational policies to respond to emerging conditions. 49
The broad ramifications of a risk-management philosophy should not
obscure its essential simplicity, however. Faced with uncertainty, the
planner seeks two critical attributes: diversification 50 and the ability to
adapt to changing conditions. Flexibility and diversity are well-accepted
notions in finance, where the sharp economic fluctuations of the past dec-
ade have underscored their value.
A planning concept that provides flexibility in the utility context is the
resource option. 51 The Act provides a mechanism for regional acquisition
of conservation and generating resources. 52 A resource option is an acqui-
sition contract that explicitly provides for regional control of the timing
and magnitude of the project.
It is important to distinguish our use of the word "option" from the
similar-sounding term "option to purchase [a share of a generating proj-
ect]" commonly used in the utility industry. In this article, an option is a
contract between the administrator of BPA and a project proponent which
48. For example, the regional energy plan now being developed by the Council will be adopted
in April 1983 (executing the mandate of § 4(d)(1) of the Northwest Power Act, supra note 2, 16
U.S.C. § 839b(d)(1) (Supp. V 1981)), after the adoption in November 1982 of a program "to pro-
tect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife" in the Columbia River and its tributaries. Id. §
4(h)(l)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(1)(A). A flexible energy plan affects and interacts with the fish and
wildlife program: changes in one influence choices in the other. In part for this reason, the fish and
wildlife program adopted by the Council contemplates studies and revisions of the program. As infor-
mation on the implementation of that program accumulates, corresponding modifications of the en-
ergy plan may also be appropriate. Thus, the complexity of the planning task set forth in the North-
west Power Act itself points to the wisdom of a flexible approach to planning, so that new
information can be incorporated in decisionmaking.
49. Note that the utilities explicitly reserve judgment on the operational implications of a risk-
managing approach to planning. PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7, at 2.
50. For an economic analysis of diversification, see Tobin, The Theory of Portfolio Selection, in
THEORY OF INTEREST RATES (1965).
51. See Northwest Power Planning Council, Resource Options Decision Memorandum 2 (Nov.
30, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Options Memorandum]:
For the purposes of power planning, options will be investments by the Region in the early
phases of resources development or investments in the early completion of a resource that can be
sold outside of the region with call back provisions. The Region will receive in return for this
financial assistance the right to exercise the option and provide additional energy to meet load
growth with shorter lead-time and higher confidence or to hold the option and delay the acquisi-
tion of additional energy.
For a helpful analysis of options using information relevant to the Pacific Northwest, see E.
MOORE, JR., R. WATTS. B. HARRER & P. HENDRICKSON, DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPLY RESOURCE PLAN-
NING OToNs (1982) (Report submitted by Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories to the Northwest
Power Planning Council) [hereinafter cited as BArrELLE OPrToNs STUDY]. This analysis identifies
three or four "cost nodes" at which project costs and schedules can be readily evaluated by regional
decision makers. Id. at 6. 1-.6.
52. Northwest Power Act, supra note 2, § 6, 16 U.S.C. § 839(d) (Supp. V 198 1).
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reserves to the administrator certain rights to alter the schedule on which
the project is built or implemented. This contract also spells out a time-
table for payments to the project sponsor from BPA, payments to meet
the costs of the project as well as certain of the opportunity costs borne by
the project sponsor. 53 In some instances, the lead-time for undertaking a
project is a good deal shorter than the period between the present and the
date at which the resource is expected to be a cost-effective element of the
regional power supply. Resources meeting this combination of criteria,
so-called "planned options," 54 can be scheduled in the Council's plan
without a corresponding effort by BPA to initiate a contract for acquisi-
tion. These planned but not yet purchased options should, in general, be
treated as less definite resource alternatives than projects for which a con-
tract has been signed.
In order to be usable in planning, an option can be no less real than any
other resource in the plan. 55 The experience of the last fifteen years indi-
cates that resource plans regarded by the utilities as "real" cannot be
counted on. 56 If the regional planning process cannot improve upon this
53. "An option is an agreement between a potential buyer and seller of a property, good or
service in which, typically, the potential buyer pays cash or other consideration to [the] seller for the
right to buy the property, good or service within a particular time on specified terms." Options Mem-
orandum, supra note 51, at 2. Identical wording is used to define "option" in PNUCC Options
Paper, supra note 7, at 1.
54. WSEO II, supra note 1, at 3; PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7, at 4.
55. The PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7, describes five general categories of resource op-
tions, distinguishing among them on the basis of how readily available each set is likely to be.
"Ready resources" like combustion turbines are available "off the shelf" on short lead-times and
with minimal licensing delays. "Sales/import options" are contractual arrangements with owners of
facilities, providing either rights of purchase (for resources outside the Northwest) or sales (to out-of-
region customers) subject to rights of recall under specified conditions. "Purchased/licensed op-
tions" have obtained relevant regulatory clearances; the holder of the option thus controls the timing
of progress on these projects. "Purchased/unlicensed options" are projects that have been included in
the plan, but which still face state and federal licensing procedures. Least reliance should be placed in
the fifth category, planned options of the kind described in the text. PNUCC Options Paper. supra
note 7, at 4-5. (Compare the five generic types of options identified by the Council, see infra note
65.)
The PNUCC suggests that a regional policy be developed to "identify those types of resources
which are firm enough to be considered for optioning." PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7, at 10.
Note that this categorization is most clearly applied to conventional generating resources. Conser-
vation is in part a "ready" resource, capable of being implemented rapidly, and in part a "planned
option," insofar as the conservation program is novel and untried on a large scale. WSEO I, supra
note 1, at 8.
56. The best known example is the schedule slippages in the nuclear projects of the Washington
Public Power Supply System. See sources cited supra at note 24. These are not the only cases of
significant disparity between initial plans and actual performance in power plant construction, how-
ever. The Skagit nuclear project and two units of the Colstrip coal-fired project sponsored by Puget
Power have suffered lengthy delays. Similar difficulties have plagued Portland General Electric's
Pebble Springs nuclear project.
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record, 57 one of the main hopes in the Northwest Power Act will have
been dashed. Thus, if there are unresolved technical questions, such as
the feasibility of stack-gas scrubbers on coal plants, 58 a credible research
and development program should be underway to settle them. If there are
uncertainties in cost and schedule, these must be managed on the same
basis for an option as for an acquired resource. 59 If there are institutional
hurdles, such as approval of a site by a state licensing authority, these
must be addressed in a timely fashion whether the project is an option or
an acquired resource. 60 In short, a resource option should be no different
from an acquired resource except in the way it is handled by the BPA and
the Council.
An option is treated differently by the region in two respects. First, the
option agreement would authorize BPA and the Council to accelerate,
delay, or cancel the project, as part of a cost-effective regional power
program. The early stages of developing a conservation program or gen-
erating resource are typically far less costly than the construction or im-
plementation phase, 61 while taking up a sizable fraction of the total time
needed for development. 62 An option agreement might therefore schedule
57. The PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7, recommends that the Council and the BPA en-
dorse requests for flexibility by utilities and other resource sponsors. Id. at 8-9 & 46-47. Such a
posture seems sensible in general, although each proposal, regarded as either a resource or a planning
option, needs to be evaluated on its merits.
58. For a discussion of the technical problems of coal power plant gas scrubbers, see Ackerman
& Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean AirAct, 89 YALE L.J. 1466 (1980).
59. A project whose schedule can be changed by regional authorities may encounter difficulties
in maintaining a high-quality work force. PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7, at 10. The timing of
schedule changes is accordingly important.
60. Options thus become a significant new rationale in the utilities' pursuit of regulatory relief.
PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7, at 13-15.
61. In a review of cost estimates for a wide spectrum of conservation and generation alternatives,
the BATrELLE OPTIONS STUDY, supra note 51, concludes that "for all resources except geothermal
and nuclear, acquisition costs at any of the specified points before construction are less than 15% of
the total capacity costs." Id. at 6.7. Costs for geothermal are high near the beginning of a project
because of the expense of site investigation and preliminary development. Id. at 6.35. In any event,
the costs of geothermal energy are still uncertain, given the limited field work done in the region to
date. Pre-construction costs for nuclear are high because of the expense of detailed safety analyses
required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and because the steam supply system is normally
procured prior to the start of construction. Id. at 6.65-.66.
The cost of delaying development of a project is also modest: if the interruption occurs before
construction starts, the cost of the first year of delay is "less than $15 per kilowatt of capacity." Id. at
6.7. As delay increases, however, changes in regulation, financing, and other conditions will affect
the viability of the project as originally defined. "[A] delay of greater than five years in exercising a
resource option will almost certainly necessitate some changes .... Id. at ES.22.
62. In a comparison of 15 categories of power resources, the BATrELu OPTIONS STUDY, supra
note 51, finds that pre-construction activities account for a minimum of 36% (light-water nuclear
reactor) and a maximum of 77% (wind farm) of the total time needed to develop the resource. Id. at
5.3. These percentages are substantially larger than the fractional cost commitments of pre-construc-
tion activities.
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a regional decision on whether to proceed, and how rapidly to do so, be-
fore construction begins.
A second way that the region treats an option differently from an ac-
quired resource is that the project sponsor may be compensated for the
risk that the project will be rescheduled or terminated. An option is a form
of insurance to the region, since it improves the ability of the regional
planning process to meet a range of loads. 63 Risk payments to the sponsor
are insurance premiums. 64
Regional resource options are an important means of improving the
flexibility of planning, but there are additional ways to do so. 65 For exam-
ple, existing generating projects can be operated beyond their normal ca-
pacity for short periods. 66 Smaller projects and resources available on
short lead-times make it easier to respond to changing circumstances.
Conservation seems unusually flexible because the size of the resource
can be adjusted; if loads grow more rapidly than anticipated, a more ag-
gressive, and expensive, conservation effort can be pursued with little
lead-time, if this possibility has been planned for. Renewable resource
projects promote flexibility as well, 67 when they are smaller than thermal
projects. Some uncertainty remains, however, on two points: the quantity
of conservation 68 and renewable resources that can be developed at cost-
effective levels; and the credibility of schedules for developing such proj-
ects. 69
It is also worth noting that large central-station plants can be made
more flexible through institutional changes, including option arrange-
ments. 70 Obtaining approval for sites and for engineering designs is a
63. WSEO II, supra note 1, at 8-15.
64. The Northwest Power Act provides that the BPA may "provide for the reimbursement of the
sponsor's investigation and preconstruction expenses." Northwest Power Act, supra note 2, §
6(f)(l)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 839d(f)(l)(B) (Supp. V 1981). This language provides a means for authoriz-
ing payment for options.
65. The Council has identified five generic types of options for planning: (1) resource options.
which are funded on a regional basis up to the point where construction begins: (2) acquisition of a
resource, together with a contract for (contingent) sale of the resource outside the region; (3) demon-
stration projects intended to verify the costs and magnitude of a resource (expected to be of major
importance in planning for conservation); (4) resources whose costs of operation can be met through
regional purchase (combustion turbines used to meet short term unanticipated demand fall in this
class); and (5) rate designs, approved in advance, that can be used to recover temporarily high run-
ning costs or to signal imminent scarcity of supply. Options Memorandum. supra note 52, at 2, 4.
66. PNUCC Options Paper. supra note 7, at 21-22.
67. The utilities judge small hydro and cogeneration to be "[tlhe best candidates for an options
portfolio of some security." PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7. at 36. The complexities facing the
development of cogeneration are discussed in id. at 50-56.
68. Id.at4O-41.
69. The PNUCC expresses skepticism about geothermal and wind as resource possibilities. Id. at
36-39.
70. Id. at 39-40.
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time-consuming part of a power plant project. If sites and licenses can be
approved and then "banked," to be used for full-scale development later,
the lead-time for large projects can be substantially shortened. 7' Simi-
larly, marketing part or all the output of a power station to utilities outside
the Northwest decreases the effective size of the commitment shouldered
by the region. 72 If these marketing arrangements include contingency ar-
rangments, perhaps along the lines of the call-back provisions in the Ca-
nadian Storage Power Exchange, 73 both size and timing can be made flex-
ible. Regional control of banked sites and callback options enhances the
risk-management capability. Finally, flexible arrangements for providing
power in the Northwest may be obtainable from sources outside the re-
gion: the spot market in wholesale power; purchase on contract; and
power exchange agreements have been used by individual utilities in the
past.74
In addition, there are institutional arrangements with consumers that
can improve planning flexibility. For instance, rate schedulesthat are im-
plemented only when a shortage looms can be used to hold down demand
on short notice, 75 if loads surge unexpectedly or supplies sag. 7 6 Such con-
tingent rates would require advance approval by public utility commis-
sions, however, to make them usable as regional options. The fact that
secure power supply is more valuable to some industrial customers than
others77 can form the basis for a futures market, 78 in which costly re-
sources can be developed on behalf of those willing to bear the risk of
paying for them in order to assure supply. Conversely, there may be con-
71. The difficulties of site banking and advance licensing are summarized in id. at 42-47.
72. Id. at 17-21.
73. See ELECmc POWER, supra note 5, at 55.
74. PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7, at 16-17.
75. See WSEO I, supra note 1, at 10.
76. Unusually cold winter weather can suddenly increase demand for electric heat, while a pe-
riod of below-average precipitation in the Columbia basin can decrease supplies of hydropower. Sud-
den changes in demand or supply have been met in two ways: through out-of-region purchases of
wholesale power, with utilities sometimes paying premium prices on the spot market; or through
reductions in use, both voluntary and pursuant to BPA's contracts with its direct-service industrial
customers. In periods of severe drought, spot market purchases have necessitated rate surcharges, to
cover the costs of imported power.
What is suggested here is a means to signal short-run changes in the supply-demand balance via
electric rates. The historical experience described above, as well as experience in other regions, indi-
cates that demand can be changed in the short run by up to 10%, through a combination of public
appeals and temporary rate adjustments. It is hard to estimate precisely, however, how much of this
short-run change can be produced initially and how long the lowering of demand can be sustained.
77. WSEO II, supra note 1, at 14.
78. See G. Hill, The Public Interest and the Evaluation of Public Policy 288-90 (1981) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
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sumers willing to purchase interruptible power, 79 who have not had ac-
cess to lower-quality power in the past; their purchases can provide peak-
load reserves and flexibility in planning.
The flexible, risk-managing approach differs from deterministic plan-
ning in one important economic respect: risk management does not mini-
mize short-run costs. 80 But if the future is really uncertain, a flexible
combination of projects can lead to much lower costs than a least-cost
investment that turns out to be based upon mistaken assumptions. 8' The
concept of portfolio diversification-not putting all one's eggs in the
same basket--embodies the same risk-managing philosophy. A diversi-
fied portfolio may not earn the maximum return, but it greatly decreases
the probability of substantial losses. 82
Of course, one can hedge one's bets foolishly as well as wisely. Re-
gional risk management is not self-implementing. But the deterministic
approach, in the face of the uncertainties that confront the region, may
guarantee failure. Putting these principles into a workable planning pro-
cess will require technical, organizational, and governmental changes. As
a first step it may be sensible to consider a deliberately oversimplified
example of how a regional plan could be more flexible.
III. AN EXAMPLE OF FLEXIBLE PLANNING
In conventional utility forecasting the objective is to estimate as accu-
rately as possible the future demand for electric power. A common ap-
proach is to make high, low, and intermediate forecasts, using different
demographic variables and assumptions about consumer response to rate
changes; typically, the intermediate forecast is selected as the planning
target. 83 When uncertainty is high, however, there may be insufficient
information to identify an appropriate intermediate case. That is, the re-
gion may have to meet a demand for power ten or twenty years in the
future that can lie anywhere within a broad range. It is reasonable to
think, however, that one can still identify a broad range within which
demand is expected to lie;84 the question for planning is how to use this
information.
79. For a discussion of interruptible power and its most effective uses. see Redman, Nonfirn
Energy and BPA's Industrial Customers, 58 WASH. L. REV 279 (1983).
80. See WSEO I, supra note 1, at 2-3.
81. Id.
82. Tobin, supra note 50.
83. The PNUCC maintains that "the most probable load forecast" should be used as a planning
target. PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7, at 6.
84. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (discussing attainable accuracy of forecasts).
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planning target 10 20
year year
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Figure 1. Upper and Lower Bound Forecasts (schematic).
Figure 1 shows a pair of schematic demand forecasts. They are limiting
cases, chosen on the basis of a consensus within the forecasting commu-
nity8 5 that actual demand will lie between the lower and upper bound
forecasts. Regional risk management proceeds this way:
1. The regional plan must assure that resources are adequate in each year of
the planning period to meet the lower bound forecast demand. This requires
resource acquisitions.
2. The regional plan must also assure that a combination of resources and
options is available to meet the upper bound forecast in each year of the
planning period. This requires development and acquisition of options, as
well as resources.
3. In order to be included in the plan, an option must meet standards de-
veloped by the Council. These standards should insure that the option can,
in fact, be converted into a resource by the year in which it is listed;
4. A regional plan developed in this fashion must be reviewed frequently-
perhaps annually-so that the mix of options and resources acquired can be
adjusted in light of new information. Important kinds of new information
The BPA 1982 FORECAST, supra note 9, was one of the first forecasts in the region to attempt a-
systematic specification of a range within which demand is very likely to be found.
85. BPA 1982 FoREcAsT, supra note 9, at 21-22.
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include changes in the existing power system; revised lower and upper
bound forecasts; data on costs and schedules of resources acquired; data on
the costs of options and their availability for the year planned; and new re-
sources and options developed since the last review.
upper bound forecast
6 sales option
unlikely/
sales option
won't recover
full cost
planning target
year year
Time (years)
Figure 2. Example of Resource Possibilities for a Target Year,
with timing of decisions to option (0) and to acquire (A).
How does one fill in the V-shaped space between the lower and upper
bound forecasts? 86 Figure 2 demonstrates an approach for a single target
86. The PNUCC identifies three approaches: 1) a "lower jaw tactic," in which resources would
only be acquired to meet the lower bound forecast, with options to fill the gap between the lower and
upper bounds; 2) an "upper jaw tactic," relying on sales options to manage excess capacity; and 3) a
"between the jaws tactic" in which a "most probable load forecast" is used as the basis of an options
approach. PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7, at 6.
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year. Looking at the target year from the vantage of the planning year in
Figure 2, the planner ranks resource possibilities in order of increasing
expected cost. 87 The resource possibilities vary in size, but when assem-
bled they span the range from resources in being-the regional system
projected for the target year-to beyond the upper bound forecast.
Lead times for these resources vary. Some projects have already been
optioned or acquired in earlier planning years, though more are needed to
reach the lower bound forecast. Some projects do not need to be started
yet, such as Project 1. In three cases-Projects.2, 3, and 6-a decision
must be made in the current planning year. The risk-management process
concentrates on these decisions.
Project 1 does not have to be examined in detail, even though, among
resources available in the target year, it is expected to be lowest in cost.
An acquisition decision has to be made on Project 2, however. Situations
like this illustrate the tradeoff between cost-effectiveness andflexibility.88
If Project 2 is acquired, an irreversible commitment will have been made
before the region has purchased lower-cost power from Project 1. The
dilemma is that the planning process cannot wait for the Project 1 deci-
sion point, for Project 2 would no longer be available, and higher cost
resources, such as Project 5, might then have to be developed. How
should one value Project 2? There is, unfortunately, no simple method for
gauging the relative value of flexibility and cost.
For this reason, among others, the design of the regional energy plan is
necessarily a task requiring judgment by the Council. Even whether to
acquire Project 2 is a choice that can be illuminated through analysis. For
example, it is possible to compare the implications of acquisition and de-
ferral of this project. Pulling Project 2 out of the resource stack-the re-
sult if the project is not acquired-would necessitate the addition of more
resource possibilities, higher in cost than Project 6, so that the range be-
These analysts misconstrue the argument of this article as one favoring the "lower jaw tactic."
PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7, at 5. I argue three related points. First, that the degree of
uncertainty is, as a practical matter, too large to permit reliance upon a "most probable load fore-
cast." Second, that a balanced approach to the circumstances facing the region would utilize both
resource acquisitions above the lower bound forecast and sales options. But third, that the mix of
these alternatives with resource options should be biased toward retaining as much flexibility as af-
fordable, rather than carrying on with the traditional single-forecast framework. My reading of the
situation of this region is rooted in the perception that Northwest power supply is not operable as a
single utility system; this leads me to emphasize a shift toward flexible planning.
87. This expected cost should include measures of the technical, environmental, and institutional
differences among resource alternatives. Some of these factors cannot be measured in monetary
terms, however, although they are clearly relevant to a decision. For example, where a given re-
source is located can affect its accessibility to the regional grid, its financing, and the political accep-
tability to local populations of proceeding with the project. These factors are put aside in this simpli-
fied example. The concept of expected cost is discussed in WSEO II, supra note 1, at 8-9.
88. WSEO II, supra note 1, at 11-12.
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tween lower and upper bound forecasts is still covered. At the same time,
deciding not to acquire Project 2 could mean that it remains available for
development in a later target year, though probably at higher cost. On the
other hand, if load growth falls in the low part of the range, foregoing
acquisition can lead to a lower cost regional system.
Note that Project 2 has a decision point for an option after it is ac-
quired. This indicates the possibility of a sales option: a contractual
agreement with a wholesale power purchaser for sales beginning in the
target year. A sales option protects the possibility of selling power at a
given price. The sales-option decision can be scheduled just before the
bulk of the money is spent on construction, thus providing an opportunity
to evaluate progress. If a sales option can be obtained by that time, the
region can proceed, knowing that there is an assured market for part of
the Project when it comes on line in the target year. At the same time, an
option to sell decreases one's flexibility, since the option is likely to in-
clude an assurance that the power will be available to sell in the target
year. Without such an assurance, the price of the option would probably
be so high that the Northwest would gain little from having it.
Project 3, like Project 1, provides the possibility of a purchase option:
an agreement to initiate a project with regional financing, subject to re-
view at the point labeled "A." The point of no return, economically
speaking, occurs soon after the acquisition decision. Project 4 was op-
tioned in an earlier planning year, and the final acquisition decision is still
some way off; no decisions need to be made in the current planning year.
Note, however, that information obtained since the last planning year
may have shifted the costs and schedule of Project 4; its position in the
stack may thus be different from a year earlier.
Project 5 is also a resource possibility for which no decision need be
made. It is high enough in the cost stack, however, that, on the basis of
current information, a future sales option may not allow the Northwest to
recover the full cost of the project. This information clearly has a signifi-
cant bearing on the acquisition decision. Finally, Project 6 requires an
option decision in the current planning year. As with Project 2, payment
to keep Project 6 available will have to be made this year, despite its
relatively unfavorable position in the cost-effectiveness stacking. The
questions that arose earlier in the discussion of Project 2 are thus relevant.
The answers to these questions may be different, however; both the high
expected cost of Project 6 and the fact that a sales option may be difficult
to arrange decrease its desirability.
These resource possibilities have been discussed schematically. Impor-
tant considerations have been slighted in this example, including the geo-
graphical location of the projects, how they fit into the priority classes
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mandated by the Northwest Power Act,89 and the operational characteris-
tics of the overall resource mix90 if these projects were to be acquired.
These complications matter, of course, and would need to be analyzed in
detail, using information developed by BPA, the Council, the utilities,
and other project sponsors and analysts.
It must also be stressed that the regional risk management process is a
dynamic one. As new information comes in about resources and about the
outlook for demand, it should be used to adjust plans and commitments.
Consider what is likely to happen in the next planning year. There is
now more information about each target year, though it is still incom-
plete. Upper and lower bound forecasts have shifted; usually, the distance
between upper and lower bounds will have narrowed, since each target
year is now closer to the point of the V.91 Second, the expected resources
in being may have changed; changes in one target year affect the re-
sources in being in later years. Third, the costs, sizes, and availability of
resource possibilities have changed; projects that have been delayed are
no longer available in the original target year. This plethora of alterations
illustrates the need for frequent review of the plan.
Regional risk management emphasizes the development of options.
Resource possibilities whose costs remain in the cost-effectiveness range
spanned by the upper and lower bound forecasts are likely to be acquired
at some point, though slow demand growth may delay them for a time.
On the other hand, if the economics of power supply change dramati-
cally, an option may be priced out of the evolving market. For instance,
federal hydro projects introduced an extremely low cost resource to the
Northwest, lowering the cost of electricity substantially; the escalating
cost of Projects 4 and 5 of the Washington Public Power Supply System,
in contrast, undermined their viability in the regional market. 92
The risk management approach also uses the information produced by
forecasting in a novel way. The stress now lies on using the bounding
estimates to define the range of resources and options needed in each tar-
get year. The traditional reliance on best-estimate forecasts has meant that
high and low cases were selected casually. There is considerable room for
improvement in choosing defensible upper and lower bound forecasts.
Asking experienced forecasting modelers for consensus judgments on in-
put data93 is a first step: what is the range within which the population
89. Northwest Power Act, supra note 2, § 4(e)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 839b(e)(l) (Supp. V 1981).
90. See supra note 43 (discussion of System Analysis Model).
91. Note that the record of forecasting provides only limited support for the hypothesis that un-
certainty decreases as one approaches the point of actual use. See supra note 31 (discussing track
record of PNUCC forecasts).
92. See Lee, supra note 24.
93. See BPA 1982 FORECAST, supra note 9, at 21-22.
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trend is nearly certain to lie? How much and little can electric energy
users respond to changes in rates? Additional information comes from
analyses of the relative costs of over- and under-building. A power short-
fall of, say, 3000 megawatts does not have the same impact as a 3000-
megawatt surplus. 94 One could choose bounding forecasts so that the up-
per and lower bounds reflect equivalent costs to the regional economy. 95
More generally, using economic forecasting to set limits for planning is a
more modest task than identifying a precise target. There is reason to
hope that approaches such as those sketched here would lead to estimates
that are more scientifically sound and less burdened by political ideo-
logy. 96
In sum, the schematic risk management approach illustrated here re-
places the concept of a single best forecast with an iterative three step
process:97
1. Use the best forecasting data and methods available to project the highest
and lowest plausible cases. These upper and lower bound forecasts should
reflect a range of demand broad enough that the actual demand can be confi-
dently assumed to fall between the bounds.
2. Develop a stack of resource possibilities to fill the span between the lower
and upper bounds for each year in the plan. The region should retain the
right to delay acquisition in light of additional information about expected
costs and demand. Options to sell part of the output of large facilities, to-
gether with purchase options-regional financing of project initiation
costs-can facilitate the development of resource possibilities while retain-
ing flexibility.
3. Make decisions as necessary on resource possibilities, so that there will
be resources acquired to meet the lower bound forecast, and so that there
will be a combination of resources and options capable of covering demand
94. Under existing rate structures (for surplus) and curtailment rules (for shortage) imbalances
between supply and demand are not allocated to minimize economic impact. See WSEO II, supra
note 1, at 13-14; ICF, INC., RESERVE-RELIABILITY ANALYSIS, STUDY MODULE V ch. 3 (Aug. 1982)
(final report to the Northwest Power Planning Council).
95. ICF, Inc., has performed an analysis of how shortages could be allocated to minimize eco-
nomic impact. Id. ch. 4. Were such an approach politically feasible, this analysis could be supple-
mented by a study of how the burden of a surplus could be similarly allocated.
96. See, e.g., ELECTRIC POWER, supra note 5, at 136 figure 16 (illustrating that power demand
projections correlate strikingly with ideology).
97. The Council's planning philosophy contemplates a more detailed seven-step analysis: (1)
Develop a range of forecasts. (2) Develop alternative resource portfolios. (3) Using the PNUCC
Systems Analysis Model (see supra note 44) and other simulation techniques, assess the probable
performance of alternative portfolios. (4) Assess the implications of the uncertainty in load forecasts
in each of the alternative portfolios. (5) Revise portfolios in light of insights developed by earlier
steps. (6) Evaluate alternative portfolios, incorporating judgmental factors such as the tradeoff be-
tween cost and lead-time. (7) Examine the effect of the selected portfolio on rates, and thereby recon-
sider the range of forecasts used to initiate the analysis. Options Memorandum, supra note 51. at
5-11.
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ranging as high as the upper bound forecast in each target year. Acquisi-
tions should be made following the cost-effectiveness and resource priori-
ties set forth in the Northwest Power Act.
Regional risk management brings to the fore the question of whether it
is possible to put a great deal more flexibility into the acquisition process.
Before discussing some of the practical issues raised by the idea of op-
tions, one should pause to observe that flexibility may not be desirable in
all cases, nor may it be obtainable on favorable terms. First, electric
power planning does not take place in a vacuum; there are costs and bene-
fits to others, and these costs and benefits depend upon how utility re-
sources are scheduled. For example, Northwest electroprocess industries
invest large sums in capital equipment on the assumption that power will
be available to utilize it. The Northwest Power Act recognizes the value
of secure supply to the direct-service industrial customers. 98 More gener-
ally, flexible, risk-oriented planning benefits some and imposes risks and
costs on others but our understanding of the distributive effects of a new
planning method is necessarily limited.99
Second, a flexible, incremental approach encounters the problem of
"second best." 00 Incremental decisions, each of which is rational, may
lead to a suboptimal outcome. Second best is the economists' version of
the road paved with good intentions. For instance, vigorous attempts to
improve the accuracy of forecasts-a rational program-may lead plan-
ners to have an inappropriate confidence in their estimates of future de-
mand; thus, incremental improvements in the single best forecast do not
lead one to the rather different approach suggested here. It is important to
bear in mind, then, that flexibility is desirable as a means to a larger end:
cost-effective power supply. On account of both the external effects of
planning and the problem of second best, it is wise to be cautious about
the value of flexibility. But a flexible approach has obvious merit in the
uncertain environment faced by the Northwest.
IV. PRACTICAL QUESTIONS
Regional risk management is clearer conceptually than practically. The
ideas discussed in this article are familiar and well-established in busi-
ness, especially in finance and other cyclical industries. Yet applying
98. See Northwest Power Act, supra note 2, § 5(g)(1)(D), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(g)(1)(D) (Supp. V
1981); H.R. REP. No. 976, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 28-29 (1980), reprinted in LEGisLAVE HISTORY,
supra note 3, at 333.
99. WSEO II, supra note 1, at 14.
100. See Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best. 24 REv. EcoN. STUD. !1
(1958).
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them to the complex web of technological and institutional relationships
that constitute electric power in the Northwest will be challenging. The
promise of the risk-management approach is large: it is the one con-
ceptual framework that offers significant, achievable strengths in facing
uncertainty.
The region will be served best by a vigorous critique of the risk-man-
agement concept. What are the barriers that stand in the way of using
these ideas to structure the regional plan? What special advantages might
accrue from using a risk-management approach, and what special disad-
vantages are attached to using it? Who will benefit, and who will lose, if a
risk-management philosophy is adopted? Most of all, is flexible planning
practical given the regional power system as it is, and will a system
shaped by regional risk management be a better one for the ratepayers of
the Northwest?
The key questions are those that surround measures to increase plan-
ning flexibility, especially resource options:
1. Who will find it sensible to provide options, and under what condi-
tions? 10 1 What are the legal, economic, institutional, or psychological barri-
ers that inhibit the development of options?
2. Are options compatible with the Northwest Power Act? Is the language of
section 6(f),102 providing for reimbursement of resource development ex-
penses, 103 adequate as a legal framework for using options?t14
3. Are options compatible with regulatory rules? 105 Approval for major gen-
erating facilities usually requires determination of the need for power]06-a
101. It is noteworthy that the PNUCC urges utilities to "participate with BPA in contract de-
velopment for optioning resources." PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7, at 9.
102. Northwest Power Act, supra note 2, § 6(f), 16 U.S.C. § 839d(f) (Supp. V 1981).
103. See PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7, at 30-31.
104. Using the billing credits provisions of the Northwest Power Act, supra note 2. § 6(h). 16
U.S.C.§ 839d(h) (Supp. V 1981), may provide a means for reimbursing utilities for options as well.
PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7, at 11.
105. See BATTELLE OPnoNs STUDY, supra note 51, § 4.0 (discussing legal and institutional com-
plexities in developing options). The Council has concluded that:
it is unlikely that all of the regulatory, legal, and institutional difficulties with the option concept
can be resolved [before the first regional energy plan is completed in April 19831. The Council's
Plan will provide incentives to assist option developers to bring the concept of options to the
point where the region can purchase an options portfolio. These incentives will include pre-
construction financing, power marketing assistance, long-term power sales contractfs], and as-
sistance from the Council in regulatory proceleldings and regulatory reform. It is important that
the Council's plan commit to working with the region's utilities and resource developers to fully
operationalize the options concept.
Options Memorandum, supra note 5 1, at 4.
106. See IDAHO CODE § 61-528 (1976); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 75-20 (1981); OR. REV. STAT §
469.300 (1981); Wyo. STAT.§ 37-2-205. See also PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7, at 13-14. Of
course, the need for power test applies only to the large facilities specified in these laws. Conserva-
tion, some renewable resource projects, and some high-efficiency resources like fuel cells therefore
do not face this regulatory complication.
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determination that is eschewed in flexible planning. "Banking" a site en-
tails a commitment by regulatory agencies that future regulations will still
be consistent with use of that location. '0 7 Permits and licenses for projects
often carry deadlines, limiting the allowable delay between licensing and
the start of construction; 108 changing this aspect of the rules of many agen-
cies will not be easy. State and federal regulations pose a significant barrier
to regional risk management.
4. Presumably, the front-end costs of most power supply projects are small
near the time of initiation: design, siting, and licensing are all activities that
require far less expenditure than construction. So an option could be pur-
chased at modest cost. But are conservation programs like this? What about
experimental resources that may involve substantial research and develop-
ment costs? More generally, what determines the cost of an option in a tech-
nical sense? 109
5. Why would a project sponsor be willing to delay or halt a project once it
is begun, and do so on the basis of regional criteria interpreted by the Coun-
cil or BPA l"0 In part, this is a matter of what the region is willing to pay for
the option in the first place. More generally, what negotiating factors influ-
ence the price of an option?'H
6. How reliable are the cost and schedule estimates of options? Can they be
made at least as credible as those for projects proposed for acquisition or
billing credits under the Act? An especially important question is schedule
slippage. It may be crucial to provide assurance that designation as an op-
tion will not increase the probability that a project will be slowed by anyone
besides BPA and the Council.1 2 Schedule slippages in the years preceding
passage of the Act may have sustained the tendency to overbuild resources
over the past decade. Overcoming the utilities' fears of slippage is a major
hurdle for any planning process, perhaps especially so for one incorporating
projects subject to regional review after they are underway.
107. See id. at 14. For example, the requirements of the Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84
Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), include re-evaluation of
the "best available control technology" for projects that are delayed. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(j)(4) (1981).
108. A hydroelectric project licensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is
bound by provisions of § 13 of the Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1071 (1920) (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. § 806 (1976)); construction must begin within two years, unless FERC grants a two-year
extension. Even small hydro projects (generally, under five megawatts of electric capacity), which
are exempted from FERC regulation, must begin construction 18 months from the time an exemption
is granted. 18 C.F.R. § 4.106(c) (1981). See PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7, at 14-15, 42-46.
109. See BArn'tiE OPnONS SToDY, supra note 51, § 6.0 (discussing costs of acquisition of
electric power conservation and supply resources); WSEO I, supra note 1, at 8-11.
110. See PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7, at 48 (discussing the value of an option to its
sponsor).
111. The price allowable under federal statute may be uncertain. Id. at 47. The negotiating
stance of BPA is also affected by considerations of how purchase of options will affect the stability of
and increases in consumer rates. Id. at 31-34.
112. The PNUCC notes the importance of according optioned projedts the same priority in pro-
cessing regulatory clearances as for projects that are acquired. PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7,
at 15.
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7. Some options involve few direct costs beyond those of negotiation, such
as contractual arrangements for power sales or purchases. What options for
the Northwest are to be found in the plans of utilities in neighboring regions
such as California or western Canada? Note that this question is similar to
that of load diversity, but the focus is on planning rather than operations.
8. Are there institutional arrangements other than contracts that can facili-
tate options? Are there conditions in which having shared ownership is ad-
vantageous? The aluminum industry has played an important role in the
Northwest power system by providing a market for reserves that had no
alternative market; 113 are there similar industry-utility compatibilities with
respect to resource options?
9. If options are obtainable, which characteristics are most valuable? What
is the relative value, for instance, of cost as compared to lead-time? Of size
compared to the uncertainties of completion on time? Does putting a high
value on flexibility lead to unanticipated results? 114 This article has impli-
citly assumed that cost and flexibility were the only relevant variables, but
clearly that is not so. What would one want from an option? What makes an
option a valuable form of insurance to the region?' 15
10. What sort of options might be helpful if the lower bound forecast indi-
cates prolonged periods of power supply surplus or even declining demand
in the region?" 16
11. This article has implicitly assumed that central planning for the whole
region will prevail. But large utilities will continue to operate autonomously
within the Bonneville service area. How are they affected by a shift to a
flexible planning process? Neither their technological or economic ability
113. See Redman, supra note 79.
114. For instance, flexibility can be enhanced by choosing technologies that have low capital
costs and high running costs. That way, a project that is little used does not exact a high penalty. So
risk management may be an unrecognized argument for burning oil in combustion turbines, a re-
source possibility that conflicts with the national goal of limiting dependence on imported petroleum.
Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (codified at
scattered sections of 15, 19, 42, 45 & 49 U.S.C. (1976)). For a general discussion see Herzog, The
Coverage of the Fuel Use Act: How to Avoid Unpleasant Surprises, 13 NAT RES. L. 553 (1981).
115. The insurance value of an option should decrease as the cost of power from that option
increases. A low-cost option is likely to be developed anyway, and thus the ability to delay or termi-
nate it is less valuable than for an option that would produce power at higher cost. The cost of an
option may rise, however, for projects deferred into the future. PNUCC Options Paper, supra note 7,
at 11.
The PNUCC also observes that the value of an option to the region must also be weighed against
the budgetary and financial constraints facing the Bonneville Power Administration. Id. at 28-30.
116. The Northwest Power Act was written in the face of fears of imminent power supply short-
ages during the 1980's. S. REP. No. 272, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1979), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 3, at 445. The publication of the WERC FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, and the
BPA 1982 FORECAST, supra note 9, has led to a substantial revision of expectations in the region and
among investors in the national capital markets. The prospect of a period of electricity surplus has
also affected the outlook for the Council's regional energy plan, in that utilities are no longer under
immediate pressure to propose projects for the plan.
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nor their continuing willingness to participate in a centrally-directed risk
management strategy can be assumed. 117
12. Can the fragile and complicated regional utility industry structure ab-
sorb the complexities of flexible planning? If the region's utilities were a
single organization, this would be a question of corporate strategy. Within
the existing fragmented situation, there is a danger that this system-level
institutional question will not be considered seriously enough." 8
V. CONCLUSION
The risks that face the Northwest are plainly visible. The technical and
institutional means of taking account of these risks in regional planning
are now being developed. Individual utilities have, of course, invented
sophisticated means to insulate themselves from the effects of the kind of
uncertainties analyzed here. Moreover, through instrumentalities such as
the Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement of 1964 or the Northwest
Power Pool founded in 1942, the utilities have acted at the regional level
to address technological uncertainties. 119 The conditions that confront the
region today arise primarily from social and economic rather then techno-
logical uncertainties; and the principal instrument for coping with these
uncertainties is the new institutional framework created in the Northwest
Power Act.
Because of the limited authority granted BPA and the Council in the
Act, the methods of recognizing, analyzing, and adapting to changing
conditions at the -regional level are critically dependent upon informed,
117. The possibilities of rapid change are illustrated by the residential power-exchange autho-
rized in the Northwest Power Act, supra note 2, § 5(c)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
Perhaps the most powerful impetus to passage of the Northwest Power Act was the perception that
large rate disparities between the wholesale power costs of publicly and privately owned utilities had
to be ameliorated in substantial degree. (The disparities arose from the preference and priority provi-
sions of the Bonneville Project Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 832d & 832f (1976 & Supp. V 1981) . This is
accomplished in the Act by providing for an exchange of power between a utility and BPA; in this
exchange, the utility surrenders power at its average cost of generation ("average system cost,"
defined in section 5(b)(7) of the Northwest Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839c(b)(7) (Supp. V 1981) and
receives power at the Bonneville Administrator's cost. The quantity of power eligible for the ex-
change is limited to that sold to residential customers, under § 5(c)(1) of the Act, 16 U.S.C. §
839c(c)(I) (Supp. V 1981). This exchange provision was written under the assumption that BPA
wholesale costs would continue to be lower than those experienced by investor-owned utilities. That
has not turned out to be the case, however, and several utilities have now discontinued their ex-
changes with BPA. Similarly, I have assumed in this article that an option developed within the risk-
management framework will continue to be desirable to all affected parties, including the project
sponsor, BPA, and the Council. Rapidly changing relative costs and shifts in demand forecasts-both
common during recent years-could readily invalidate this assumption.
118. See ELEcTRic POWER, supra note 5, ch. 3, for a parallel analysis of the Hydro-Thermal
Power Program, which faltered, in part, because it sought region-scale objectives without adequate
commonality of interest among its autonomous participant utilities.
119. Id.ch.2-3.
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creative, timely, and constructive leadership from the utilities, state and
local governments, and interest groups. The concepts of flexible risk
management set forth here are offered as a framework within which genu-
inely collaborative planning can take place.
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